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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of the paper is to gain insight into the 
changing role of the National Audit Office (NAO) in 
public accountability with the backdrop of the legal 
amendments that instituted the Office.  The paper 
seeks to analyse the strength of the Office’s legal 
mandate, evaluate the understandability of NAO 
reports as well as discuss the Office’s bearing on 
public policy. 
The discussion draws upon semi-structured interviews 
conducted with three NAO Officers and thirteen main 
users of NAO reports, consisting of Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) Members, Opinion Makers and 
Public Officials.  The analysis takes stock of relevant 
PAC transcripts and of visits made to PAC meetings. 
INTRODUCTION
‘Accountability’, as applied in the public sector, 
takes a different form from its application in the 
private sector (Ingstrup & Crookall, 1998).  Public 
accountability is wider in extent and not limited 
to the internal accountability of public officials 
towards their ministerial chain of command 
(Bovens, 2007; Ingstrup & Crookall, 1998).  This 
wide accountability setup exposes public officers 
to answer directly to the citizen (Bovens, 2007; 
Mulgan, 2002).  As suggested earlier by Normanton 
(1966) the discharge of public accountability 
requires statutory rights to inspect and inquire 
public officials.  State auditors are entrusted with 
these rights to bypass the internal ministerial chain 
of governments and to prevent any distortions from 
reaching public fora.  
The Maltese National Audit Office had been 
established as a separate and independent Supreme 
Audit Institution (SAI) following the legislative 
amendments that took place on July 25, 1997.  Its 
predecessor, the Department of Audit, fell within the 
ambit of the Ministry of Finance.  The old legislative 
framework is a far cry from the one presently in 
vigour.  The amendments redefined the Maltese State 
Audit because the Auditor General is a parliamentary 
appointed institution. Indeed, the Office has now 
been operating autonomously under its Constitutional 
vest for more than a decade.  In view of this relatively 
new role, some questions crop up.  What is the legal 
mandate of the Maltese NAO vis-à-vis the ideal of 
‘public accountability’? Departing from the premise 
that the NAO is a watchdog and not a bloodhound, 
is its alarm-call clearly discernible?  Is its legal 
empowerment giving actionable information?  What 
are the main users’ perceptions of state audit reports? 
Does the standard of reporting give clear information 
about the use or misuse of public funds?  With regards 
to the learning dimension, how do audit results and 
recommendations affect public policy?  
The Regulatory Setup
The Constitution of Malta (1964) describes the 
appointment and the functions of the Auditor General 
and the Deputy Auditor General.  The President of 
Malta appoints the Officers in conjunction with a 
resolution from Parliament, which has to be supported 
by at least a two-thirds majority. The core mandate of 
the NAO is the financial and regularity audit of the 
accounts of the Government of Malta and all bodies 
making use of the Government’s funds.  The Office 
is also empowered to audit the economy, efficiency 
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and effectiveness of Government departments and 
entities.  These are also known as Value For Money 
(VFM) audits or performance audits.  
The NAO’s primary audience is the Parliament of 
Malta, and the Public Accounts Committee is the 
organ where the NAO’s output is discussed.  Special 
audits, inquiries and investigations are made on the 
Auditor General’s own initiative or requested by either 
the Minister of Finance or the PAC (Auditor General 
and National Audit Office Act, 1997). In addition to 
its main functions, the NAO appoints private auditors 
for local Government, and reports upon the results of 
these audits in its Annual Audit Report.
THE REMIT OF THE NATIONAL AUDIT 
OFFICE
The framework used for discussing the legal mandate 
of the Maltese NAO poses four questions that seek 
to define its scope: when and how can the NAO 
execute its powers?  What are the criteria by which 
the NAO can conduct its audits and investigations? 
Where can the NAO establish jurisdiction?  Figure 
1 illustrates the framework used for discussing the 
research findings.
Questions (1) and (2) are perhaps the simplest 
to answer.  The NAO can audit and investigate 
activities undertaken by the Government, either on 
its own initiative or when requested by the PAC or 
the Minister of Finance.  These enquiries would 
mandate specific terms of reference by which the 
Auditor General would be obliged to adhere.  The 
NAO can then avail of its statutory powers including 
the power to administer oaths and the power to 
sequestrate public files and databases.  Research 
findings suggest that questions (3) and (4) are the 
most unclear in defining the strength of the NAO 
mandate.
What to Audit: Criteria for fulfilling Audit Mandates
The core function of the Maltese NAO is the 
annual financial and compliance audit of financial 
statements issued by the Treasury.  The criteria 
by which the NAO carries out this function are 
prescribed by the Financial Administration and Audit 
Act 1962 (FAAA) and its subsidiary regulations. 
The FAAA, being the “mamma” of these regulations, 
defines the public officials that are responsible for 
ensuring that regulations are adhered to (Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, 2006a: p. 9).  Any 
audit engagement, investigation or inquiry that uses 
such criteria will inevitably adopt a rules-based 
approach that aims to provide assurance on the 
legality of financial reports.   By elimination, any 
other mandate has the shaky task of determining 
‘good governance’ in terms of the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy programmes 
or through ad hoc investigations.  
Where to Audit: Ownership versus Control
Public accountability weaknesses may arise where 
state auditors do not have a legal authority on the 
annual financial audit of public entities (ASOSAI, 
1989; Bottomley, 2000).  This weakness had been 
predicted by Normanton (1966), who pointed out 
the tendency of state auditors to narrowly focus on 
the accounts of bodies under treasury control.  He 
also added that there is “no practical reason why 
state audit should not examine and draw useful 
conclusions from the accounts of bodies which spend 
public moneys under other systems of regulation, or 
indeed without any system at all” (Normanton, 1966: 
p. 373).
One PAC Member drew attention to an apparent 
legal anomaly which might prevent the Maltese 
State Auditor from accessing information pertaining 
to entities in which the Government has a non-
majority shareholding.  In fact, the legal mandate 
gives the Maltese NAO the power to inquire into 
and report on “the operations of companies or other 
entities in which the Government of Malta owns not 
less than 51 per cent of the shares” (Auditor General 
and National Audit Office Act, 1997: Schedule 1 
Figure 1 Framework for analysing the NAO’s Mandate
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s9(a)(iv)). One might agree or disagree with the 
respondent’s suggestion to expand the remit of the 
Auditor General to include entities in which the 
Government has a minority interest.   That may very 
well be a philosophical debate that transcends this 
discussion. 
 
What the response willingly or unwillingly points 
out is that the Law falls short of distinguishing 
between ‘majority ownership’ and ‘public control’. 
And this is a crux in public accountability.  Any 
government may be able to control an entity even 
if it has a substantial, minority ownership.  In other 
words, if accountability implies controllability, the 
respondent’s proposition gains much more relevance.
The Audit Jurisdiction of the State Auditor
How should one go about assessing the adequacy 
of the NAO’s legal mandate?  The legitimacy of the 
NAO’s role in public accountability depends on what 
is being audited and where it is being audited.  It is 
inadequate to assess the legal remit of state auditors 
solely on the basis of where they can establish 
jurisdiction.  The NAO’s role in Governmental 
departments is undisputed not only because these 
offices are part of the Government but also because 
there are objective and enforceable criteria, such 
as financial regulations, that make these places 
auditable.
But where separate legal entities are involved, legal 
interpretations of the NAO’s legitimate role may 
easily conflict.  The PAC investigation on the Voice 
of the Mediterranean radio station can be brought to 
bear weight.  In this atypical case the NAO had been 
requested to investigate the financial compliance 
and ‘good governance’ of the entity’s operations. 
It transpired that the NAO could not undertake a 
financial and compliance investigation because the 
entity’s constitution did not specify its abidance 
with financial and public procurement regulations 
as one of its objects (Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts, 2006a).  In other words, there were 
no criteria by which the NAO could objectively 
investigate the financial conduct of the station. 
What remained was the elusive task of determining 
good governance via the VFM route.
The NAO is not empowered to conduct the annual 
financial audit of separate legal entities.  However, 
it is empowered to inquire and report upon any 
issue pertaining to the entity; this gives it a very 
wide remit because the terms of reference may very 
well include a variety of issues.  Notwithstanding 
this, if the NAO is requested to inquire on financial 
and compliance issues on an ad hoc basis, it may 
only fulfil that mandate if public regulations are 
enforceable either by the entity’s memorandum and 
articles or by statute.
Enforcement and Execution
Audit mandates in most democratic states do not 
confer the power to punish or sanction auditees 
(Friedberg, 1987; Normanton, 1966).  One possible 
reason was given by Mulgan (1997), who argued 
that the restriction does not prevent state auditors 
from calling public managers to give their account. 
In other words, the power to call to account is 
sufficient to render the state auditor’s  role in public 
accountability.
But how far should state auditors go in combating 
administrative irregularities and public 
mismanagement?  Interview respondents pointed 
out the distinction between serious irregularities and 
administrative shortcomings. A serious irregularity 
refers to the outright breach of laws and regulations 
governing a public office, department or other entity. 
Administrative shortcomings refer to weaknesses in 
the internal controls of the department or entity.
The Maltese Auditor General has the power 
to recommend the imposition of penalties on 
responsible individuals who do not comply with 
public regulations (Auditor General and National 
Audit Office Act, 1997). This is a tool which the NAO 
has hitherto not utilised because as one NAO Officer 
put it “there may be legal difficulties in practising it, 
especially in light of the fact that the Office does not 
have a legal background”. In addition, one Opinion 
Maker indicated that although the NAO’s powers are 
adequate, “they are not personalised”, in that they 
fail to ensure that corrective action is taken on, or by, 
the responsible individuals. 
In the case of administrative shortcomings, this 
power is not so clear because deficiencies of this 
sort do not always lead to an outright breach of 
laws and regulations.  However, one is inclined 
to favour the recommendation of a penalty if 
administrative shortcomings seem to recur without 
due consideration from the auditees, as has been 
outlined by respondents.
Although this legal tool has never been used by 
the Office it is unclear whether penalties have ever 
been called for, or whether the NAO has opted out 
purely out of expediency.  What is clear is that there 
are legal difficulties in proposing penalties.  For 
this reason, some of the claims that the NAO is not 
structured to bite the responsible parties gain even 
more weight.
In reality, pinpointing the culprit may not always 
be possible.  The NAO might not feel confident 
enough to point its finger because it lacks the legal 
background to do so.  The bottom line is that the 
only legal tool, available to the NAO to pressure the 
executive into taking remedial action, is obviated by 
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the legal difficulties in implementing it.
Lacuna in the Reporting Line
As pointed out by Borge (1999), state audit oversight 
is practised on three main levels:
 i. The Office reports suspicions to other 
investigative bodies, and collaborates to determine 
whether suspicions have valid grounds for prosecution;
 ii. The Office notifies suspicions to the appropriate 
authorities, such as ministers;
 iii. Suspicions are notified only to the head of 
department or body being audited.
Another important distinction is that between serious 
irregularities and fraudulent activities.  While the 
former is of an administrative nature, the latter 
translates into a criminal offence.  Despite the 
distinction, the provisions set out in the Auditor 
General and National Audit Office Act (1997) provide 
for the same reporting line, as illustrated in Figure 
2. The Auditor General is obliged to give notice of 
any serious irregularity or fraudulent activity to the 
responsible Minister.
It is debatable whether this is the ideal kind of 
arrangement since the system relies on the bona 
fide follow up of the Minister in charge.  The setup 
is unlike that which is in place at the Internal Audit 
Investigations Department (IAID), which resides 
within the Office of the Prime Minister and has two 
reporting lines in place.  The IAID Director is legally 
bound to report any fraudulent or criminal activity to 
the Attorney General.  As one Public Official stated, 
“we are speaking of the Supreme Audit Institution 
here, and if the IAID has more legal leverage than the 
NAO, then there’s a serious problem”.
Indeed, follow-ups of fraudulent and criminal 
activities resulting from NAO findings do not have 
any history. Two Public Officials and one Opinion 
Maker drew a comparison between the NAO and the 
IAID. Interestingly, the respondents perceived the 
IAID to be more effective in capturing illicit activities 
because it has “mani in pasta” in Government. The 
respondents could recall actual prosecutions against 
suspects as a result of IAID investigations but could 
not associate the NAO with similar proceedings. That 
being said, the subtle suggestion was that the NAO is 
in a “straitjacket” as it is “not structured to bite”; its 
genetic makeup precludes it from doing so.
As things stand, one can reasonably argue that there 
exists an institutional lacuna between the NAO and 
other Maltese institutions.  Is there some kind of 
vacancy between the NAO and other law enforcement 
institutions?  Is this gap associated only with the 
NAO, or is it part of a wider disconnection between 
the ‘checks and balances’ of the State?
Figure 2 NAO Reporting Line of Irregular and Fraudulent Activities (Auditor General and National Audit Office Act, 1997)
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REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION
The Public Accounts Committee
The effectiveness of audit reports should be measured 
in terms of the mark they leave on their readers. 
Mifsud Bonnici (2007) had pointed out that, despite 
their frequency, NAO reports in Malta seldom attract 
the exposure that is required to spark public debate. 
But this is something depending on the effectiveness 
of the PAC itself.  According to Hedger and Blick 
(2008) PACs in many developing countries lack 
the administrative personnel and research facilities 
which are necessary for analysing audit reports.  The 
PAC’s capacity is important because “that which 
strengthens the effectiveness of the PAC strengthens 
that of the Supreme Audit Institution, and vice versa” 
(Hedger & Blick, 2008: p. 34), otherwise described 
as a relationship based on “symbiosis” (Wang & 
Rakner, 2005: p. 22).
Users of NAO reports were asked to express their 
opinion on the clarity and understandability of 
NAO reports. Perceptions of audit reports were very 
positive. Respondents were quick to point out that 
the reports are clear and objective. Audit findings 
are backed by factual and accurate evidence, making 
NAO reports very reliable. According to respondents, 
other institutions governing the State should be able 
to take action on the reports presented by the NAO.
The PAC, however an avenue to public accountability, 
may ironically be one of the reasons why NAO 
reports may not be fulfilling their intended results. 
The PAC represents the teeth of the Maltese NAO 
as it can publicly expose managers and pressure the 
executive into taking action.  Therefore, a discussion 
on the effectiveness of the NAO as an institution 
should revolve around the PAC’s use of the State 
Auditor’s reports.
It appears that the teeth need some good sharpening. 
Respondents expressed their doubts about some of 
the members’ preparedness to Committee meetings. 
One Opinion Maker stated that the passive attitudes 
of a number of parliamentary members leave much 
to be desired, and that “blank faces let you down”. 
The lack of time and back-up resources was seen 
as impinging on the members’ preparedness to 
Committee meetings, thereby affecting the quality of 
the scrutiny that is made on Public Officials.
Research findings show that the PAC in Malta lacks 
the necessary resources.  What is lacking might be 
a bit of both technical knowhow and time resources. 
This should also be seen in light of the fact that the 
Maltese NAO is churning out more reports.  The 
issue ties in neatly with the claim that the Annual 
Audit Report is not being scrutinised as deserved, 
because other reports are stealing the show.  As one 
respondent put it:
 “As a result of the lack of resources, the analysis 
of the Annual Audit Report has become the run of 
the mill in PAC meetings. Appropriate expertise, 
at this level of scrutiny, is a sine qua non in public 
accountability.”
Furthermore, the Maltese system does not ensure a 
level playing field for the State Auditor.  Indeed, the 
PAC tends to fall into the temptation of criticising the 
NAO’s methodology, rather than limit the discussion 
to the audit findings.  Five respondents recalled 
instances when “the PAC’s scrutiny actually turned 
on the NAO”.  It is true that the NAO is the working 
hand of the PAC.  But the Office is also vested with a 
Constitutional role and the system should ensure that 
it is treated as such.
Part 2 of this feature will be published in the summer 
2012 issue of the Accountant.
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